

# Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

February 12, 2025

The Honorable Chris Wright  
Secretary  
U.S. Department of Energy  
1000 Independence Ave SW  
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Secretary Wright:

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an integral part of the Department of Energy (DOE), is entrusted with protecting the nation's most sensitive nuclear weapons secrets. The nation and the world need to know that U.S. nuclear secrets are robustly safeguarded. It is, therefore, dangerously unacceptable that Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) — including individuals lacking adequate security clearances — has been granted access to DOE's information technology (IT) system despite legitimate security concerns inside the agency. There is no justification for relaxing basic security procedures when it comes to our nuclear stockpile, but recent actions reflect a brazen disregard for DOE security policies. DOE must ensure that all personnel with access to classified information and systems surrounding our nation's nuclear arsenal follow the highest security standards.

The NNSA, established in 2000 as part of DOE, plays a critical role in ensuring the nation's nuclear security. Created in response to the growing need for specialized oversight in nuclear weapons stewardship and nonproliferation efforts, the NNSA oversees the development, maintenance, and security of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Its mission encompasses a broad range of responsibilities, including the modernization of nuclear weapons, securing nuclear materials, and advancing nuclear nonproliferation and arms control efforts globally. The NNSA's work is vital not only in safeguarding the country from potential nuclear threats but also in upholding U.S. leadership in global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. With a complex and evolving geopolitical landscape, the NNSA's ability to adapt and ensure a secure nuclear future remains integral to U.S. defense policy.

Recently, you were quoted as saying that three individuals involved with DOGE are at DOE and “have access to look around, talk to people, and give us some good feedback on how things are going.”<sup>1</sup> And according to media reports, a 23-year-old former SpaceX intern, who does not have the appropriate security clearances needed to access DOE's IT system, received access over the objections of members of its general counsel and chief information offices.<sup>2</sup> This incursion into some of the nation's most sensitive files is the latest in a series of Trump administration moves to plant unqualified Musk and DOGE staffers throughout the federal government, some of whom have records of leaking sensitive information and potentially wreaking havoc with vital information systems.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Spencer Kimball, *Elon Musk's DOGE staffers don't have access to U.S. nuclear secrets, Energy secretary says*, CNBC (Feb. 7, 2025), <https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/07/doge-staffers-at-department-of-energy-dont-have-access-to-nuclear-secrets-secretary-says.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Ella Nilsen & Sean Lyngaas, *Trump energy secretary allowed 23-year-old DOGE rep to access IT systems over objections from general counsel*, CNN (Feb. 7, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/06/climate/doge-energy-department-trump/index.html>.


<sup>3</sup> Gistaf Kilander, *DOGE team member fired from cybersecurity internship for leaking company information*, The Independent (Feb. 7, 2025), <https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/americas/us-politics/elon-musk-doge-staffer-fired-leaking-b2694431.html>.

As members of the congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group, we are deeply concerned by this disregard of DOE security protocols and the potential impacts on our nuclear security. To help us better understand DOGE's involvement with U.S. nuclear secrets and the grave security threat it poses, please respond in writing to the following questions by February 14, 2025:

1. What is the process for granting, reviewing, and revoking security clearances for DOGE staffers at DOE?
2. Have any DOGE staffers been given access to NNSA classified nuclear weapons information, specifically Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, or Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information? If so, please provide the names of DOGE staffers, their security clearance levels, the dates their clearances were granted, and the programs or types of data these staffers accessed.
3. Under what authority and justification was each instance of classified access granted to DOGE staffers?
4. Are DOGE staffers required to undergo training on the handling of classified information?
5. What security measures are in place to ensure DOGE staffers do not improperly access or inappropriately share sensitive nuclear secrets?
6. Have any DOGE staffers with access to classified information had significant outside financial interests, foreign contacts, or other affiliations that could pose security concerns?
7. Are NNSA employees included in the Administration's buy-out offer for federal employees? If so, and if senior NNSA employees leave the organization, how do you plan to maintain the security and secrecy of nuclear weapons and related information?


We appreciate your attention to this urgent matter of U.S. nuclear security and look forward to promptly receiving responses to our questions.

Sincerely,



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Edward J. Markey  
United States Senator



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Donald S. Beyer Jr.  
Member of Congress