WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Representative Edward J. Markey (D-MA), co-chair of the Bipartisan Taskforce on Nonproliferation, today released a letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Jeffrey T. Bergner indicating that any proposed agreement to resolve the current diplomatic standoff over Iran’s nuclear program would not involve U.S. agreement to transfer nuclear materials or technology to Tehran.

Rep. Markey said, “This letter represents the first acknowledgement by the Administration that current legal restrictions on nuclear transfers to state sponsors of terrorism bar any direct or indirect U.S. nuclear cooperation with Iran for the foreseeable future.”

“I fully support a negotiated solution to the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program, and I believe that such a solution is clearly possible.  But the United States doesn’t need to rip further holes in our nonproliferation laws to get there, and it has a legal obligation to ensure that no U.S.-origin nuclear material or technology is retransferred to Iran by any third party,” Markey continued.

The Bergner letter came in response to a May 16 letter Rep. Markey sent to President Bush requesting clarification on press reports that the so-called P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) had offered Iran nuclear cooperation, including the provision of advanced Light Water Reactors, as part of an incentives proposal to end the crisis over that country’s nuclear program.  

Last year Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which included two amendments offered by Rep. Markey and former Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA).  The first of these amendments prohibits the transfer of nuclear material, equipment, or technology to nations identified by the Secretary of State as sponsors of terrorism.  The second Cox-Markey amendment further prohibits the assumption of any legal liability by the United States for nuclear incidents in any such nation designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, including liability associated with the construction or operation of nuclear facilities.  Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984.

In the August 11 letter, Mr. Bergner wrote, “Given Iran’s central role in sponsoring terrorism, any transfer of a light water reactor could not, therefore, include any U.S.-origin nuclear materials, equipment or technology.”

Rep. Markey also made public today a memorandum prepared at his request by experts from the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) detailing the various legal implications of the P5+1 incentives proposal delivered to Iran on June 6, 2006.  The CRS memorandum listed a number of U.S. laws which would restrict U.S. participation in the incentives plan.  Beyond the issue of Iran’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism, the CRS memorandum notes that the United States and Iran would have to negotiate an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.  In order to negotiate such an agreement, the President would have to waive restrictions within the Atomic Energy Act barring nuclear trade with nations such as Iran that have materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement.  Such a waiver would necessitate an affirmative vote of approval in both the House and Senate of the agreement, a step that would be highly unlikely in light of Iran’s nonproliferation record and previous support for acts of terrorism.

The CRS experts wrote, “It is likely that U.S. involvement [in nuclear cooperation with Iran] would be quite limited for several reasons: significant nuclear exports are prohibited in the absence of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran and such exports would be terminated even if an agreement were concluded, because of new restrictions in the Atomic Energy Act on state sponsors of terrorism; dual-use nuclear exports are the subject to the comprehensive trade and investment embargo; and financial and economic assistance is restricted because of Iran’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism.  In addition, Iran’s current status as a state not in compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations could pose further restrictions, although presumably it would resolve any compliance issues before assistance could proceed.”

Rep. Markey concluded, “Iran is expected to respond to the proposed ‘incentives package’ by August 22nd, and it is required to respond to the UN Security Council’s demand for a suspension of uranium enrichment activities by the end of the month.  It is clear from the State Department response to my letter that if an incentives package is worked out, it cannot legally include U.S.-supplied nuclear materials or technology.”

For further information, visit http://markey.house.gov.